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1957] RECENT DECISIONS 871 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-STATE ACTION-EFFECT OF STATE COURT INTER-
PRETATION OF A CONTRACT-Mrs. Doris Walker, president of her local union, 
was discharged by Cutter Laboratories in 1949 because of membership in 
the Communist Party and falsification of her employment application. The 
employer acquired knowledge of these facts in 1947, but did not act at that 
time to avoid charges of persecuting a union officer. The union, pursuant 
to the collective bargaining agreement, which authorized discharge for 
"just cause" only, sought and obtained reinstatement from the arbitration 
board, which action was affirmed by the district court of appeal,1 but re-
versed by the California Supreme Court.2 On certiorari to the United 
States Supreme Court,3 the union contended that the state court's decision 
rested on a public policy against membership in the Communist Party in 
violation of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Held, writ dismissed, three justices dissenting. Since the 
state court construed the agreement to mean that membership in the Com-
munist Party is "just cause" for discharge, the decision can be sustained on 
adequate state grounds and there is no basis for review of constitutional 
questions. Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 351 U.S. 292 (1956). 
An examination of the California Supreme Court's opinion raises a 
question as to whether the majority of the United States Supreme Court 
did not overestimate the significance of the former court's statement allud-
ing to the effect of the contract.4 Assuming, however, that the majority is 
1 Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 266 P. (2d) 92 (1954). 
2 Mabel Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 43 Cal. (2d) 788, 278 P. (2d) 905 (1955). 
3 350 U.S. 816 (1955). 
4 See the first sentence of the dissenting opinion in the California Supreme Court, 
note 2 supra, at 809. The California Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction to review 
the arbitration board's construction of the contract. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. (Deering, 1953) 
§1288. See also the opinion of the district court of appeal, note 1 supra. The California 
Supreme Court, immediately after indicating that the ground of appeal was that the board 
had exceeded its power, launched into an eight-page discussion of public policy and the 
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correct in its interpretation of the California decision, there remains a 
federal question which would seem to have merited consideration by the 
whole court. The restrictive covenant cases, beginning with Shelley v. 
Kraemer,5 established the doctrine that a state court's enforcement of a 
contract is a state act, and that the enforcement of covenants restricting the 
sale or use of real property on a racial basis is unconstitutional as a denial 
of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.6 In Shelley v. 
Kraemer the Court denied injunctive relief, and this doctrine was later 
extended to preclude an action for damages, even when the suit was against 
a person not of the class discriminated against, because of the overbalancing 
consideration of public policy against enforcing these contracts.7 The 
Fourteenth Amendment, which forbids the states to discriminate on the 
basis of race, together with the First Amendment, also denies the power to 
discriminate against a political group.8 Does it follow, then, that the 
majority's decision is inconsistent with the rule of Shelley v. Kraemer be-
cause it allows the state, through the enforcement of a private contract, to 
interfere with Mrs. Walker's freedom of political belief when she has been 
charged with no wrongful act?9 In Shelley v. Kraemer, the Court was care-
ful to point out that the racially restrictive covenant was not void as un-
constitutional, because the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment 
apply only to states, not to individuals. The Court specified that a viola-
tion occurred only in the granting of affirmative relief by the state.1° 
What, then, is the legal status of these restrictive covenants? Since the 
Supreme Court said that the unconstitutional act occurred when the state 
court granted affirmative relief, it was suggested that such covenants would 
still constitute a valid defense to a claim for affirmative relief because this 
would not require state action. There appears to be some logic in this 
argument, on the theory that since the covenant is not void, a party should 
not be held liable for acting in accordance with its provisions. The ques-
tion came before the Supreme Court in an Iowa case11 where burial privi-
leges were denied an Indian on the basis of a discriminatory covenant 
which was asserted as a defense to a tort claim brought by the owner of 
a cemetery plot.12 The Court was evenly divided and later dismissed 
Communist Party, note 2 supra, at 798. There was no discussion in the opinion concern-
ing the matter of contract enforcement except for a single rhetorical sentence at the end 
of the opinion. 
5 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 
249 (1953); 3 A.L.R. (2d) 441 (1949). 
6 Groves, "Judicial Interpretation of the Holdings of the United States Supreme Court 
in Restrictive Covenant Cases,'' 45 Iu.. L. REv. 614 (1950). 
7 Barrows v. Jackson, note 5 supra. 
s De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937). 
9 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
10 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 at 19 (1948). 
11 Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, 348 U.S. 880 (1954). 
12 The defense was upheld by the state supreme court, Rice v. Sioux City Memorial 
Park Cemetery, Inc., 245 Iowa 147, 60 N.W. (2d) no (1953). The court distinguished 
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certiorari when state legislation was found to govern the case.13 The argu-
ment that such restrictions could be used defensively was flatly rejected by 
a Texas court,14 which based its decision on Shelley v. Kraemer. There, 
the covenant acted as a condition in the deed and the defendant in an 
ejectment action attempted to support his claim to title on the operation 
of this condition. Both of these cases involved property rights, but not in 
exactly the same sense. In the Texas case, title to the property was in-
volved, whereas the Iowa case involved an incident of ownership, not 
ownership itself. The Texas case is easier because there the effect of the 
covenant was affirmatively to shift title from one person to another. Both 
of these cases differ from the principal case, however, in that the former 
involved property rights, whereas the principal case concerned a purely con-
tractual right. We thus have two grounds for distinguishing the principal 
case from Shelley v. Kraemer15 and for defining the legal status of restric-
tive covenants. First, it is clear that affirmative relief cannot be predicated 
upon such an agreement, whether the right affected is of property16 or 
purely contractual.17 The Texas decision appears sound in denying the 
covenant as a defense where the title to property is directly affected.1 8 A 
more difficult question is raised by the Iowa case, and remains open, i.e., 
whether such a covenant can be asserted as a valid defense where enjoy-
ment of property is involved, though the title itself is not in issue. On the 
other hand, the principal case would indicate that such an agreement may 
be properly asserted as a defense to an action involving a purely contractual 
right. In support of this interpretation, it may be suggested that the courts 
are not enforcing such a covenant, rather _that its existence simply makes it 
impossible for the plaintiff to show a promise made in such terms as to 
allow recovery. Any conclusions predicated upon the principal case must, 
of course, be qualified by the fact that the majority did not discuss this 
issue, although they in effect decided it. It might be well to consider 
whether the disposition of the principal case would have been the same 
had the contract justified discharge on racial grounds rather than on the 
basis of membership in the Communist Party. 
Dudley H. Chapman 
Shelley v. Kraemer on the basis that the restrictive covenant was not being used as grounds 
for affirmative relief. 
lSRice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, 349 U.S. 70 (1955). Justice Frank-
furter's opinion indicated that the Court had been troubled by the question of what 
constituted state action. See Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512, 87 N.E. (2d) 
541 (1949), cert. den. 339 U.S. 981 (1950); 14 A.L.R. (2d) 133 (1950). 
14 Clifton v. Puente, (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) 218 S.W. (2d) 272. 
15 First, the restrictive provision is being asserted as a defense and, second, the rights 
affected are solely contractual, not of property. 
16 Shelley v. Kraemer, note 10 supra. 
17 Barrows v. Jackson, note 5 supra. 
18 "It is as much an enforcement of the covenant to deny a person a legal right to 
which he would be entitled except for the covenant as it would be to expressly command 
by judicial order that the terms of the contract be recognized and carried out." Clifton v. 
Puente, note 14 supra, at 274. 
